We propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting which incorporates the three main factors affecting voting choices of individual citizens: party identification, policy preferences and candidates' valence. Using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections we identify and estimate (1) the distribution of voters' policy positions, and (2) candidates' valence. In this respect our analysis differs from existing empirical economic studies of voting which restrict their analysis on single elections and focus on the estimation of policy preferences only.
Introduction
In representative democracies elected politicians take policy-relevant decisions on behalf of their constituency. Voters' decisions to support a particular candidate in an election for public office may have important policy consequences. Hence, individual voting behavior may contain information on citizens' political preferences. * I thank Antonio Merlo for guidance and many helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania for their comments and in particular Bob Inman for the very useful suggestions. Finally I thank Keith Poole for his assistance with the DW-NOMINATE coordinates data.
Many researchers in political science have focused on the characterization of the main determinants of voting. 1 The consensus view is that voting choices of individual citizens are typically affected by three factors: party identification (that is, a voter's attachment to a particular party), policy preferences, and candidates' valence (that is, candidates' personal characteristics such as honesty, charisma, integrity, trustworthiness, or leadership). While voters will in general differ with respect to their policy and party preferences, they will typically agree that candidates with a relatively higher valence are preferable.
The following observations emerge from data on voting in two consecutive U.S. presidential elections. First, we observe all possible voting profiles: there are individuals who vote for the democratic or republican candidate twice, individuals who vote for the democratic candidate in the first election and for the republican candidate in the second election and vice versa. Second, "voting persistence" and "switching behavior" are both quantitatively significant phenomena: while a large majority of voters, around 80 percent, votes for the same party's candidate in two consecutive elections, the remaining 20 percent votes for candidates of different parties in two consecutive elections. Third, voting patterns differ by party identification: voters who identify with a particular party are more likely to vote for that party's candidate, but the extent of "party loyalty" and switching behavior vary accross parties.
In this paper we propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting which incorporates the three aspects of individual voting behavior mentioned above and allows us to provide an equilibrium interpretation of the empirical evidence. Using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections, we identify and estimate (1) the distribution of voters' policy preferences and (2) candidates' valence. In this respect, our analysis differs from existing empirical economic studies of voting which restrict their analysis on single elections and focus on the estimation of policy preferences only.
We consider a two-period model of voting, where, in each period there are two candidates running for the presidency. Each candidate has an exogenous policy position and valence which are constant over time. The incumbent (that is, the candidate who wins the election in the first period) runs again for office in the second period and faces a new challenger.
There is a continuum of voters who care about both the policy implemented by the winning candidate and his valence. Voters observe candidates' policy positions but not their valence.
Voters are heterogeneous with respect to their party identification, information status, policy 1 See, e.g., Campbell,Converse, and Stokes (1960) , RePass (1971) , Jackson (1975) preferences and demographic characteristics. We introduce two roles for party identification.
First, we assume that there is a relation between voters' party identification and their policy preferences. Second, we assume that party identification has an impact on the access They are however consistent with anecdotal accounts of the events surrounding the elections we focus on.
In addition to provide an equilibrium interpretation of the observed voting profiles and electoral outcomes, we use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual experiments to assess the relative importance of candidates' policy positions and valence as well as voters' information on electoral outcomes.
Before turning our attention to the description of the model, several remarks are in order. First, most of the existing empirical literature on voting bases its estimates of voters' policy preferences on variables containing self-reported information on individual attitudes towards policies and candidates (see, e.g., Cahoon, Hinich and Odershook (1978), Rabinowitz (1978) , Poole and Rosenthal (1984) , Poole (1998) , Enelow and Hinich (1984) ). In contrast to these studies, we estimate the distribution of voters' policy preferences using their observed voting behavior, given their individual characteristics. Our approach relies on a revealed preference argument which identifies fundamental utility parameters from observed optimal choices and is analogous to the approach used by Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Heckman and Snyder(1997), Londregan (1999) The variation in the data generated by repeated voting, plus the facts that different individuals face the same candidates in each election and the candidate that wins the first election runs for office also in the second election, allow us to separately identify voters' policy preferences and candidates' valence.
In section 2 we describe the model. In section 3 we describe the equilibrium and in section 4 we discuss the modeling assumptions. In section 5 we describe the empirical analysis and in section 6 we conduct some counterfactual experiments.
The Model
There are 2 periods, 1 and 2. In each period there are 2 candidates running for President, D
and R , where D denotes the democratic candidate and R the republican candidate. Each candidate c ∈ {D, R} is characterized by a one-dimensional policy position y c ∈ [−1, 1],which corresponds to the traditional liberal-conservative dimension,and valence x c ∈ {L, H}, L < H, where L and H denote respectively low and high valence. Both y c and x c are exogenously given and fixed. In period 2, the incumbent President (that is the candidate who won the election in period 1), reruns for office and faces a new challenger.
There is a continuum of voters with policy preference within the interval [−1, 1]. We index each voter by j. Voters observe the candidates' policy positions but they do not observe their valence which is privately known by each candidate. However, voters know the distribution of valence in the population of potential candidates, and we let q ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that a candidate has a high valence. 2 Voters are heterogeneous along three dimensions which we label as party identification, information status and policy preferences. Each voter j has an exogenous party identification, k j ∈ K = {d, r, i}. Specifically, when a voter has a democratic party identification, k j = d, it means that she considers herself democratic, when a voter has a republican party identification, k j = r, it means that she considers herself republican and when the voter has an independent party identification, k j = i, it means that she does not feel attached to any particular party. We will alternatively say that voter j has party identification k or that voter j's group is k, where k denotes an element of K. The proportion of voters belonging to k is n k (n k ∈ [0, 1], P k∈{d,r,i} n k = 1). Party identification affects the access to information. Each voter j from group k, has a probability m k of becoming informed and a probability (1 − m k ) of remaining uninformed.
The informed voters receive in each period a signal about candidates' valence. Let I j ∈ {0, 1} denote voter j's information status, where I j takes the value 1 when the voter becomes informed and 0 when she remains uninformed. Information status is fixed during the two periods, that is, if a voter is informed in the first period she will be informed also in the second period. Party identification not only affects the probability of becoming informed but also the type of information received. Let s t 0 and s t k denote the signal received at time t by an uninformed voter and an informed voter from group k respectively. We assume that an uninformed voter, independently on her party identification, does not receive any signal, assuming that people who feel attached to a party are more likely to be informed about their own party's candidate. We justify this assumption with the fact that typically individuals with a partisan party identification go to their party's conventions, they read partisan newspapers, they are more likely to have friends of the same party with which they talk about their party's candidates. For tractability of the model we assume that party identification is exogenous, while, for identification purposes we assume that it is fixed. These assumptions can be partially justified by the fact that we restrict our analysis to the short-term dynamic. 4 Party identification is also related to a voter's policy preferences. In particular, within party k, the distribution of ideal points of individuals with characteristics
where W j belongs to the space of individual characteristics W and Y k takes value in the interval [−1, 1]. We denote the ideal point of individual j, by y j . The assumption that, for each group k, the distribution of ideal points has full support, is justified by the evidence that voters' self-placement along a liberal-conservative scale is distributed on the full support of such scale irrespectively of voters' party identification. 5 The utility of the voter depends on the identity of the elected politician. In particular, we assume that a voter's utility for candidate c depends both on the distance between her ideal point and the candidate's policy position and on the candidate's valence, R }) and candidates' distribution of valence in the population (q) voters have perfect information on the signal's structure, the distribution of voters across party identification and the group specific distribution of ideal points (that is, they know n k , m k , Y k (.), ∀k ∈ K). 4 Party identification is supposed to capture a long term attachment to a party. We are aware of the fact that party identification is subject also to short-term variations and that even its long-term component changes over time (expecially in the years covered by our analysis). Besides, Green (1990) has showed that once measurement errors are taken into account, party identification appears to be very stable. He also suggests that "it may be a useful simplification to regard party identification as exogenous with respect to variables such voting behavior, candidate evaluations, issues proximity and retrospective performance evaluation". 5 In the CPS survey respondents are asked to place themself on a 7-points liberal-conservative scale. We find that all the seventh points have positive mass irrespectively of the party identification group. Similar results are encountered in the Gallup's opinion polls.
There is no abstention in the model and voters are assumed to vote sincerely: given their beliefs about candidates' valence, their party identification, their information status, their ideal point and their signal, they vote for the candidate that if elected gives them the higher expected utility. 6 As tie breaking rule we assume that when a voter is indifferent between the two candidates she votes for each of them with equal probability.
We can summarize the timing of the events as follows. Voters party identification is known before the beginning of period 1. At the beginning of period 1 voters observe the identity of the two competing candidates and their policy positions; some voters become informed and receive a signal about the candidates' valence. During period 1 they vote and at the end of the same period they observe the outcome of the election (the voting share and the identity of the winning candidate). 7 At the beginning of period 2 voters observe the identity of the new challenger and his policy position. They do not directly observe the incumbent's valence but they update their beliefs using the information contained in period 1' s voting share and signal. 8 The informed receive another signal on candidates' valence. 9 During period 2 all voters vote and at the end they observe the electoral outcome.
Strategies and Equilibrium
Let S k be the signal space for group k, and Π 
difference in voter j's utility when candidate R is elected rather than candidate D. 6 The literature is divided with respect to the assumption of sincere versus strategic voting. For example the assumption of strategic interaction among voters requires a high degree of voters' sophistication and coordination. Besides, sincere voting allow us to avoid to deal with the continuum of equilibria that strategic voting would otherwise generate in a context of a continuum of voters. 7 The voting share is a sufficient statistic for the electoral outcome. 8 If, instead of assuming that voters know the distribution of policy preferences but do not observe the winning candidate valence, we assume that voters can observe the winning candidate's valence through his behavior while in office, the equilibrium voting behavior for each state of the world wouldn't be affected. 9 The signal is reduntant for the informed voters of the same party as the incumbent's.
Proposition1:
The unique equilibrium strategy profile with sincere voting {(v
is characterized as follows. For any voter j ∈ [−1, 1] with party identification k ∈ K and with policy position y j ∈ [−1, 1]:
Were the expectation is taken with respect to the beliefs {P k,I } (k={d,r,i},I={1,0}) on the distribution of candidates' types which is calculated using Bayes Rule.
The proof is trivial and follows directly from sincere voting. The two elections are linked by the effect of the aggregate outcomes on beliefs, however, sincere voting together with the fact that the incumbent's type and policy position as well as voter's information status are constant over time, imply that period 1's voting behavior is independent of period 2's.
Notice that although the equilibrium strategy is unique, the individual's actual voting choice depends on the realized information status and on the state of the world, that is which of the finite and discrete combination of candidates' valence is realized. Let X = {HHHH, 
the voter is indifferent and will vote D(R) with probability 1 2 .
(ii) Each cut-off point is of the form:
,where
is individual j's expected difference in abilities at time t (between candidate R and D);
is the "midpoint" of the candidates' policy positions ;
is the "gap" between the two candidates' policy positions.
Proposition 2 tells us what are the elements that affect the equilibrium voting strategy, therefore, it can be used to analyze the possible voting profiles that can emerge in equilibrium.
A first thing to notice is that only the elements which enter in the expression for the cut-off points are relevant to the equilibrium strategy. In each period t, any cut-off point can be expressed just as a combination of the midpoint between the two candidates' position, m t , their gap, g t , and the weighted expected difference in valence λE period and so on. Let y tk and y to be the cut-off point at time t respectively for an informed voter from group k and for an uninformed voter. Take and informed voter j with party identification k and ideal point y j . When y 2k < y j < y 1k her voting profile will be DR, when y 1k < y j < y 2k her voting profile will be RD. Analogously, the uninformed voter will generate the profile DR when y 2o < y j < y 1o and RD when y 1o < y j < y 2o .
One very important observation is that the model puts restrictions on the possible states which are compatible with the observed voting patterns. If, for example, the cut-off points related to a particular state and candidates' position are such that, for some k, y 1k > y 2k and y 10 > y 20 , then, we can conclude that such state is incompatible with observing all the voting profiles within group k. This is because voters in group k would only generate the profiles DD, DR, RR. This situation occurs for example when y
, and candidate R is the winner of the first election (which corresponds to having m 1 > m 2 and g 1 < g 2 ). In this case the observed voting profiles would be incompatible with a state where all candidates have a high valence (state HHHH) and the incompatibily would arise from the behavior of the independents. Specifically, the cut-off points of an informed independent would be y 1i = m 1 and y 2k = m 2 , while the cut-off points of an uninformed independent would be y 1o = m 1 and
. Since y 1i > y 2i and y 10 > y 20 , the independents in equilibrium cannot generate RD. The details about which states are compatible with the candidates' configuration (that is their policy positions and the identity of the incumbent) and observing all four voting profiles are contained in appendix B.
Proposition 2 also allows us to derive the following result about the electoral outcome. The result that the outcome of the first period's election reveals the valence of the incumbent is what makes the model an equilibrium model instead of just a simple individual decision making problem. As a consequence of the corollary, some voters, the ones that in the first period do not receive a signal on the valence of the candidate that will win the election, use in equilibrium the information contained in the electoral outcome.
Discussion of Modeling Choices
Before turning to the empirical analysis it is important to stress that there are two main key features in the data. The most important feature is that we observe all the four voting profiles (DD, DR, RD, RR) both at aggregate level and within each group k. The second 10 There is a particular combination of parameters in which uninformed voters cannot distinguish between the state in which in period 1 both candidates have a low valence and the one in which both candidates have a high valence. See Appendix A for the details.
feature of the data is that the four voting profiles are heterogeneous across groups, that is the frequency of each profile changes by party identifications. Our model must be able to generate equilibrium predictions coherent with such features. In particular, we can show that, within our framework, each element of the model (that is the policy dimension, the valence dimension, asymmetric information and party identification) is necessary for such a purpose, that is, whenever we drop any one of these element the model becomes inconsistent with the data.
When voters do not care about policies, voters heterogeneity is only due to differences in information. In this case, the model generates too little variation in dynamic voting behavior because everyone with the same information votes the same way. For any state there is at least one group of voters, the one of voters belonging to the party whose candidate will become incumbent in period 2, that can generate at most two voting profiles (DD and RD or DR and RR). period t ∈ {1, 2}, by voting R receives an expected utility of qH
the only information about the opposite party's candidate is just the prior distribution of types, independently on the information status,). In the first period, the uninformed voter will randomize between the two candidates with probability
because she receives an expected utility of qH + (1 − q)L when she votes for either candidate. The informed, on the other hand, when D has a high valence (that is when she receives the signal s
and when D has a low valence (that is when she receives the signal s 1 d = {L, 0}) she will vote for R (H > qH + (1 − q)L). In the second period both the informed and the uninformed voter, knows the incumbent's valence. By voting D, a democratic voter can receive an expected utility of L when the incumbent has a low valence and H when the incumbent has a high valence. Solving for the optimal voting choice in all the possible states, it turns out that, when the democratic candidate's valence is H the informed can only generate the profile DD and the uninformed the profiles DD and RD.
Analogously, when the democratic candidate's valence is L, the informed can only generate the profile RR and the uninformed the profiles DR and RR.
When voters do not care about valence (λ = 0) we go back to the standard onedimensional spatial model of voting. Voting behavior is driven only by policy concerns.
In particular, when −(
2 she votes for R ; she randomizes with probability Table 1 describes the data that we use from the first source. Table 1 Descriptive statistics 17 There is also a party identification variable which uses a 7-points categorization and takes into consideration the strenght of party identification. We choose the 3-point categorization first of all because our model doesn't incorporate the strenght of party affiliation, second, because our measure is more stable over time and less responsive to short-term shocks. 18 We are aware of measurement errors related to recall questions. 
Estimation procedure
In the model voters know their own ideal points but the econometrician doesn't. Since we are interested in the link between individual's characteristics and policy preferences for each group of voters, we assumed that voter j's ideal point is a party-specific, non deterministic function of her characteristics W j and party identification k j . Here we fix a particular functional form for the distribution of ideal points Y k . Specifically, we assume that y j is draw from a beta distribution with support [−1, 1] and parameters (p jk , r jk ). 23 We parametrize the first parameter of such distribution to j's characteristics W j (BLACKS, EDUH, EDUC, SOUTH, FEMALE, AGE, MINCOME) and we further restrict the coefficients r jk to be the same within and across groups. Since p jk > 0, r jk > 0 our parametrization becomes
where β k and r are preference parameters to be estimated. 24 Candidates' positions are exogenous parameters which are available in the data. For any candidates' positions and state of the world, the unique equilibrium with sincere voting induces a different voting behavior. We cannot estimate valence directly because different candidates' valence lead to different equilibrium voting behavior and consequently to different conditions on the parameters that we want to estimate. However, since for any state there is a unique equilibrium voting behavior, we can estimate the parameters of the model by 21 To provide a term of comparison we can for example give the coordinates of President Carter and
Reagan which are -.364 and .608 respectively. 22 Such coordinates were downloadable from K. Poole's home page. I thank K Poole for his collaboration in obtaining such data and for his useful suggestions. 23 We choose the Beta distribution which is the most flexible distribution and it is defined on a finite support. 24 In general it is very hard to separately identify the first and second parameter of the beta distribution.
Some sort of restrictions are neccessary. We could have opted for different parametrizations but ours is probably the more flexible since we want to allow both the mean and the variance to differ across party 
We fix q to 0.5, which is equivalent to an uninformative prior, and we estimate β k , r, m d , m r , m i and z conditional on candidate's valence x. 26 The parameter z is a composite parameter. As we mentioned is section 3, it is impossible to separately identify the weight λ and the perceived maximum possible difference in candidates' valence (H − L), which is independent on the realized valence. A big value of z may be due to the fact that voters
give a high weight to valence or that potentially candidates' valence can be very different.
We could fix either λ or (H − L) to some arbitrary value but since these two concepts are somehow related and we are not interested in the estimation of λ and (H − L) per se, we prefer not to take any stand on their value and to estimate the composite parameter z. because the derived equilibrium voting profiles are incompatible with the data. 28 We can 25 We use b jk to indicate the density function of policy position of voter j with characteristics W j belonging to group k as a short form for b(p k (W j ), r k ). The analogous for the cdf. 26 It is not necessary to fix q. However, when we fix it, we improve the precision of the estimates for the other parameters. We fix q to 0.5 both because it corresponds to an uninformative prior (hence it is a neutral choice if we do not have any apriori information) and because when we estimate q we cannot reject the hypotesis that it is equal to 0.5. 27 If we fix λ and we estimate (H −L), the estimate of (H −L) is very sensitive to the particular parametrization of λ. The same is true the other way around. 28 In the states HHHH and HHLH and LHLH, the independents cannot generate the profile RD. For any value of z > 0, both y 1i > y 2i and y 10 > y 20 . In the states LLHL and LLLL the democrats cannot then restrict to three states: HLLL, LHHH and HLHL. 29 We estimate the model by maximum likelihood separately conditional on each of these states and we obtain that the state corresponding to the highest likelihood is HLLL. 30 Table 3 shows the equilibrium cut-off points corresponding to this state. In equilibrium when the state is HLLL, the informed generate the profiles DD, DR, RR and the uninformed the profiles DD, RD, RR. The conditional likelihood function of voting profile V j of voter j from group k is:
where the probabilities of each voting profiles are calculated using the cut-off points corresponding to the state HLLL and dd j , dr j , rd j , rr j , are dummies for individual j's voting profile. Using a different notation we can rewrite the above likelihood as:
which using the Beta cdf can be rewritten as :
generate the profile DR because the conditions that we would need to impose on z to have y 1a > y 2a and y 10 < y 20 are incompatible . We do not have to worry about the particular case in which the aggregate share when the two candidates in the first period are both a high valence is equal to the aggregate share when the two candidates in the first period have both a low valence, appendix A, because the above inconsistencies remain. 29 See Appendix B. 30 Each case requires different restrictions on z in order to generate cut-off points compatible with the four voting profiles. In the first case z ∈ (0.23; 3.701), in the second case z ∈ (1.45; 3.64), in the third case z ∈ (0.23, 0.27). Based on likelihood criteria, given a likelihood at convergence of -885.49 for the state HLLL, we could exclude LHHH (with a likelihood at convergence of -896.85) and HLHL (with a likelihood of lees than -1000).
The likelihood of individual j 0 s voting profile unconditional on her party identification and the total loglikelihood can be written respectively as:
where pidR j , pidI j , pidD j , are dummies for j's party identification. Table 4 shows the estimates for β d , β r , β i . To interpret the coefficients on individual's characteristics note that a bigger value corresponds to a bigger p jk whose effect is to move the mass of the beta distribution to the right. It follows that the higher is the coefficient on any individual characteristic the more conservative are voters with such characterisitic 31 .
Estimation Results
RACE has a big (negative) effect on all groups. SOUTH has a very strong (positive) effect on Democrats and an almost significant effect on Independents while it is has no effect on
Republicans. EDUC has a significant (negative) effect on Democrats and Independents while EDUH has a significant (negative) effect on Republicans. This means that among Democrats and Independents voters with a higher level of education are more liberal than those with a mid or lower level of education, while, among Republicans the opposite is true, that is, it is the least educated that are most liberal. FEMALE is (negatively) significant only among Independents and slightly significant among Republicans. AGE doesn't help to explain policy preferences. MINCOME has a relatively significant effect only on Democrats. It is interesting to notice that besides the high correlation between income level and education, income level have a separate and opposite effect from education. While higher education makes Democrats more liberal, high level of income makes them more conservative. Note that none of the individual characteristics are very significant among Republicans probably due to the small number of observations with profile different from RR. figure 7-9 ). Southerns are more conservative than non-southerns ( figure   3 ), however the effect is very significant for Democrats followed by Independents while it is not significant at all for Republicans ( figure 13-15 ). This result is consistent with the division that was occurring during those years between southern and non-southen Democrats and with the known fact that southerns were in general more conservative than northerns. Although at aggregate level higher educated voters are more conservative than mid-educated and lower educated voters respectively (figure 2), education has a different effect across party identification ( figure 10-12 ). Even if women are more liberal than men both among Independents and Republicans ( figure 16-18 ), the effect of gender disappears on aggregate (figure 4). As expected from the point estimates, Democrats with an income level lower than the median are more liberal than those with a highest level( figure 19 ). Age doesn't have a separate effect on policy preferences, however, Independents voters more than 62 years old appear more conservative than the youngest ones. Such effect is probably due to the correlation between age and education. Considering the relative homogeneous demographic composition of different groups, these results seem to imply that there is a strong sorting of individuals among party identifications on the base of unobservables characteristics. 32 If we look at just the aggregate relationships between policy positions and individual characteristics we can arrive to misleading conclusions. Political candidates who choose their platform in order to target particular groups should take such differences into consideration. Overall, Democrats have more heterogeneous preferences on the policy spectrum than Independents, than Republicans (figure 25) whose distribution of ideal points is relatively concentrated to the right. In coherence with the findings of other studies and with the self-reported liberalconservative view of the population, our estimated agregate distribution of ideal points is relatively conservative. political preferences of American voters. 34 In addition, our results allow to disentangle the effect that each characteristics has on voters' policy preferences and get further insight on 32 Except with respect to race, whose distribution among parties is clearly asymmetric. 33 Rabinowitz 1978, finds a conservative distribution of policy preferences in 1968. CPS self-reported position on a 7 point liberal-conservative categorization in 1972. Gallup's polls in 1968. 34 For a discussion, among others, see Scammon and Wattenmberg (1971), Miller and Shanks (1996) .
the relation between demographics and political views of the American citizens. It is also very important to stress that we do not use any apriori information on individuals' political preferences to get such results, we rather apply a revealed preference approach in which we use only data on how individuals vote in two consecutive elections and some of their characteristics.
35 Table 5 shows the estimates for the remaining parameters. The estimated probabilities of receiving information on candidates' valence (m d , m r , m i ) indicate that Democrats and
Republicans are more likely to be informed than Independents (68% and 29% probability respectively against 18%) and that Democrats are more informed than both Republicans and Independents. As we would expect if we think that there is some cost of gathering information, we estimate that even if Independents have a richer information (they receive signals on both candidates), they have a smaller probability of receiving such information, compared to the other groups. The estimate of r is really imprecise. Although we restricted r k not to be party specific we cannot unambiguously separately identify the constant term in p jk and r. It is also hard to separate the effect of the mean of the distribution of policy positions from z, which enters in the expression of the cut-off points. When we jointly estimate p jk , r and z, the estimate of z is not too precise while when we fix r to some value not only the estimate of z becomes very precise but we also eliminate all the correlation between p jk and 35 In particular we didn't use any of the variables available in the CPS survey which are related to the proximity of individuals' to candidates and parties: feeling termomenters, positions on different issues etc.
Such self-reported measures of proximity to candidates are known to suffer from the "projection" and "
persuasion" hypothesis and are likely to be non interpersonally comparable. Nixon's success was due mainly to the coupling of his relatively moderate economic policy and his extreme ability to deal with foreign affairs, but, as Watergate revealed, he was not a trustworthy politician. The secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969 is an example of his effort to overexpand the President's war power; impoundment of funds was a way to take the power of the purse from Congress; he made a wide use of veto power, of administrative discretion, of executive orders and secrecy. After the leakage of information in 1971 about the secret bombing of Cambodia, Nixon and Kissinger started a series of illegal wiretapping and they organized a special apparatus "the Plumbers" designated to plug possible leaks but "this clandestine group began to do more than originally charged". 37 His "attack group" lead by
Colson was specialized in the collection of information on democratic rivals to be used later to discredit them. His "dirty-tricks team", an old institution in American politics that reached high level in 1964, was taken to new heights in 1972. Famous are the secret effort to discredit and defame Daniel Ellsberg (who published on the New York times a top secret study on the origin and conduct of the war in Vietnam) and the fake cable created in the attempt to 36 Scammon and Wattenberg 1971. 37 Genovese 1990.
link President J.Kennedy to the assassination of south Vietnam's president. "In addition to the normal and expected work of the President's reelection effort, a subterranean operation of illegal money-collecting and dirty tricks was employed. In an effort to accumulate enough money to run the campaign, the president's money collectors went beyond the bounds of pressuring potential donors to extorting funds". 38 The strategy for Nixon's reelection in 1972 starts with a campaign in the democratic primaries against the strongest democratic candidates in the hope of forcing them out of race so as to face a weak democratic opponent in the general elections. Muskie dropped out of race after the New Hampshire primary, his election the public started to question the largest thrust of his campaign: credibility and competence". 39 The O'Brien's case, the Eagelton's case and the Salinger's affair are only few of the many examples of his inability to take clear decisions and to maintain promises. 40 We can now interpret the observed voting patterns in the light of the results of our model.
Taking into consideration the fact that we found Democrats to be relatively conservative, we can say that the informed Democrats who vote Humphrey in 1968 and switch to Nixon in 1972 (20.7%) are voters with a moderate policy view who know that Humphrey has 38 Genovese 1990. 39 White T (1973). 40 After the convention closes, the new candidate assembles the National Committee of his party, appoints 
Robustness
While in section 3 we discuss the elements of the model which are necessary to explain the qualitative features of the data, here we discuss the ingredients that are important from an empirical point of view. They can be grouped in two categories: information status and party identification. Some are strictly required for identification purposes and others are required to obtain a better fit of the data.
In our model the information status, whether a voter receive a signal, is assigned at the beginning of the first period and remains constant thereafter. This is a critical assumption which allows us to identify the probability of being informed. In fact, we can identify m d , m r , m i because by holding the information status of each voter fixed, informed and uninformed generate opposite switching patterns.
Another assumption related to the information status is that at each point with positive mass there is a fraction m k that becomes informed. 41 This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the aggregate voting share perfectly reveals information on candidates' valence.
Moreover, because of this assumption, the aggregate voting patterns directly put restrictions on the probability of being informed.
None of the assumptions on party identification are necessary for identification. They 41 The probability of being informed maybe related to policy preferences or to observable characteristics or maybe just a random effect.
help to explain better the features of the data. 42 It would be difficult to explain differences in dynamic voting patterns across parties without these assumptions. We estimated a model in which we completely eliminate the role of parties. The model in which each voter has the same probability of becoming informed (m k = m, ∀k), the same signal (s
t R }, ∀k) and in which voters policy positions are a draw from the a common distribution (β k = β ∀k), is rejected by both likelihood test and goodness of fit test. The data reject a model in which party identification is not taken into account.
We reach similar results even if we shut down each element of party identification at a time. On the basis of goodness of fit test on dynamic voting profiles and on likelihood test, we reject both the model in which preferences are constrained to be the same accross parties and the one in which there is a common probability of being informed. 43 The assumption that individuals with a partisan party identification receive only the signal about their own party's candidate is not an ad hoc nor an identifying assumption. We estimated a model where all the informed voters, independently on their party identification receive signals about both candidates. Such a model leads to a smaller likelihood, therefore, on the basis of likelihood criteria, our assumption on the party specific signal structure is not rejected by the data. 44 The data support our idea that party identification works like an information selection device which restricts the kind of information that one is willing to absorb.
Goodness of Fit
To assess whether our model can reproduce the quantitative features of the data we want to measure how close the predicted voting profiles are to the observed ones. Table 6 .1, 6.2 and 7 show the actual and fitted voting profiles on aggregate and by party identification.
The "actual" column reports the frequency in the data (overall or by party identification) of each voting profile. The "predicted" column reports the estimated probability of each voting profile. This is calculated by integrating over voters (overall or within a particular group) the individual's probability of such profile. We perform standard goodness of fit test on both dynamic and static voting profiles and report the relative X 2 test at the end of each table. The assumptions we refer to are: the relationship between policy positions and party identification; the party specific probability of becoming informed and the asymmetry in the signal accross parties. 43 The likelihood of the model in which there is a unique distribution of policy preferences has a loglikelihood of -1100.95 while the one in which there is a common probability of becoming informed is -911. An additional and complementary way to assess the goodness of fit of a model is to verify how it performs out of sample. We make two different types of out of sample predictions.
First, we estimate the model on either one of the half samples of the original dataset and make out of sample prediction on the other half. 45 Second, we use the estimated parameters from the original sample to perform out of sample predictions on the voting behavior of individuals in 1968 and 1972 elections using data from the General Social Survey (GSS). 
.0303 * The critical value at 5% for a X 2 with three degrees of freedom is 7.81 .0007 X 2 * * (1) .0007 * The critical value at 5% for a X 2 with one degrees of freedom is 3.84 45 In NES studies respondents are usually given two types of forms. In any interview one part of respondents answers to Form I and the other to From II. There are two types of half samples. The first type of half sample has some respondents receiving Form I and others Form II in the pre-election interview. The second type of half sample has the first half receiving Form I and the second half receiving Form II in the pre-election inteview. We use the second type. We couldn't estimate the model on the half sample of the first type becase after using our sample selection criteria we were left with an insufficient sample. In the first half all the blacks Independents vote DD. In the second half all southern Republicans vote RR. Our model performs very well on the GSS data. An additional experiment we perform is to assess the effect the probability of being informed has on the electoral outcome. This is relevant since parties can affect such probabilities during a campaign. While we cannot find any combination of probabilities that would have Last, we can use our model to make an assessment about the incumbency advantage.
Starting from the empirical observation that most of the time incumbent politicians have a higher probability of being elected than new challengers, a large literature on the incumbency advantage has been developed. One possible explanation of such advantage is that in presence of moral hazard and averse selection an efficient electoral process guarantees that good politicians are elected with a higher probability. 54 Another explanation has to do with risk averse voters who prefer to elect a known incumbent than a new, hence "more risky", challenger. 55 Here we want to offer an opposite point of view: although low quality incumbents can be reelected and they can be reelected with a greater margin than in the election in which they were first appointed, we cannot say that there is an incumbency advantage. Famous are also the early morning meeting of the "attack group" with the intent to prepare Nixon's campaign speeches: "statements, attacks and rispostes designed to make McGovern look like a fool". Micheal
Genovese (1990) . 54 Banks and Sundaram (1998). Farejhon (1986) has a model with only moral hazard where politicians that exert higher effort have a higher probability of being reelected. 55 Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) .
tually did. 56 In our model a low valence incumbent has a disadvantage, but as it happened in 1972 he can be reelected with a big margin. A high valence incumbent has an advantage but he may be defeated. 57 democratic candidate in the second period has a position more liberal than the democratic candidate's in the first period, y 
